The aim of this research is to answer the question how the American think tank experts on the Middle East and US foreign policy towards the Middle East perceive the region and its construction, with a particular focus on the process of Othering. In order to achieve this aim, the article presents the theoretical explanations of the Othering. In the empirical part, the results of semi-structured interviews with the experts are analyzed and presented. The interviews revealed three angles of how the Middle East is perceived. These angles are the geographical location of the Middle East, the securitization of the Middle East and the universal superiority of the United States. The main finding of the research is that the perception of the Middle East is connected with the self perception or the question of "What is the United States of America?"
Introduction
Even though there are quite a number of studies dedicated to think tanks and their influence on policies, there is a lack of analysis on the perceptions of experts that actually might have an influence on the results of their research, and finally, have an impact on the decision makers who, assumably, listen to the expert opinions to some degree. Therefore, this article aims to answer the question how
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Danguole Bardauskaite the American think tank experts on the Middle East and US foreign policy towards the Middle East perceive the region and its construction, with a particular focus on the process of Othering. In other words, the main question here is, if and how "the Middle East" is perceived by the experts. The scientific significance of answering this research question is defined through the contribution to the existing knowledge on the U.S. think tank community as well as through the fact that think tank experts' perceptions on what is "the Middle East" were not analysed in the previous research.
This article is based on the interpretative analysis and the method of semistructured interviews. The interpretative approach is chosen because the perceptions are subjective and hardly fits into questions raised by the rational or foundationalist theories that usually do not even pay attention to these kinds of questions. Thus, the theoretical basis of this article is mostly built on the authors who previously analyzed the Othering and the construction of regions in the studies that were not necessarily related to the analysis of think tanks. The empirical part of the article explains the findings of the interviews, which reveal threefold think tank experts' perception of the Middle East: 1) the Middle East as a geographical area (region); 2) the Middle East as inferior to the U.S.; 3) the Middle East as an insecure (dangerous) place or space. These aspects were identified during the analysis of the interviews, while having in mind the theoretical ideas about the Othering.
Even though think tanks are knowledge producers, their interest in policy processes makes them a bridge between academia and the policy world.
1 In other words, think tankers and policy makers share common mindset when the most important goal is finding sensible foreign policy decisions. However, Edward Said's idea that the bridge between think tanks and governments is a part of "a sausage factory of power knowledge, allowing an ever-deeper consolidation of power" 2 provides some basis to assume that the service of being the "bridge" of think tanks might also have some consequences on the mindset and independence of experts. Said's well-known monograph "Orientalism" was one of the pieces that opened a question of how knowledge might create myths about the Middle East and how knowledge becomes included in the Othering. Meanwhile, the knowledge produced by think tankers was analyzed only scarcely and episodically.
The interviews with the selected U.S. think tank experts revealed that think tank experts reproduce the United States' identity, while talking about the Middle East.
The research also shows the subtle differences of expert opinions on the question of "What is the Middle East?", but they do not allow claiming that "the Middle East" is not seen as one entity with its unique features. In sum, the analysis and assessment of the interviews' results suggests that think tank experts are less interested in what the Middle East is, but more about what the policy makers should do to make it more like "us". Thus, the answers of experts signal that the perceptions on the Middle East provide answers to the question "what is the United States of America?"
Theoretical assumptions about the Othering
There is a common acceptance among scholars that regions are constructed rather than factual. On the other hand, the foundationalist position among scholars is still dominating the foreign policy analysis when knowledge goes "beyond self, into the foreign and distant."
3 Edward Said claims that this kind of knowledge, when knowledge is based on ontologically stable "facts", creates superiority because then scholars have an authority over the object that is analyzed. 4 This foundationalist ontological position builds the base for the Othering in the scholarly work. However, the anti-foundationalist position is not the assurance that there will be no Othering.
It might be claimed that foundationalists perceive regions as a "factual" or "as natural and fundamental building blocks of global geography, rather than being recognized as the constructed, contingent, and often imposed political-geographical units that they [continents in original text, A/N] are." 5 The word "imposed" does not mean that scholars or "the West" are the oppressors and that the Other must be emancipated. The argument here is that this kind of process happens systematically and there is no answer how to avoid the Othering.
It is proper here to ask the question: what is the Othering? It is the "discursive struggle" 6 in social sciences that created "a series of simple oppositions in which (our) 'facts' are distinguished from (their) mere 'values', (our) 'rationality' from (their) 'irrationality', (our) 'identity' from (their) 'difference', [and] consolidate the belief that the Middle East is one entity. The West Pole Fallacy that was presented by Patrick Thaddeus Jackson might also be applied to the Middle East because when people are talking about the Middle East, they assume that it is one entity and that "there is an empirically correct answer to the questions about that entity's essence."
8 Therefore, "the Middle East" in this article's title is written in inverted commas. Nevertheless, Lewis Martin in his monograph "The Myth of Continents: a critique of metageography" admitted that "we cannot but continue to use terms that we make great efforts to debunk."
9 In other words, even though the Middle East is a constructed concept rather than a brute fact, still occasionally, "the Middle East" is described "as if it were a whole -sometimes even foregoing the use of the quotation marks". 10 In this case, I admit my own limitations of analysis by avoiding answers how experts should define or understand "the Middle East".
The Othering is not only a series of oppositions but also the unconscious instrument for identity construction for the states because "the state only knows who and what it is through its juxtaposition against the radical, threatening Other." 11 or, in the words of Neumann, "Identity and difference are bound together."
12 Identity and foreign policy are closely related because "foreign policy discourse always articulates a Self and a series of Others"
13
, even though it is too difficult to trace "the causal effects of identity on foreign policy."
14 That is why foreign policy here is considered as a way when the distinction of self/other is produced, reinforced or legitimized without discussing the question of what is the impact of the Othering on foreign policy of the United States.
Ling criticizes the self/other distinction and claims that this distinction does not speak about the Other because "For constructivists, the Other affects world politics only through (self-) interest.", 15 and "the Other remains either absent, silent, or lobotomized. The Other has no Ideas." 16 The Other becomes silent because they "can speak as long as they speak in a 'language' that is already recognized by is "valuable as a sign of European-Atlantic power over the Orient".
19 Edward Said does not speak about the power of the Orient. Thus, I agree with other authors who claim that studying Othering is important in order to find out how the Self perceives itself. In other words, "the self/other nexus", when a scholar attempts "to identify the slash and how it is maintained", 20 is helpful in order to understand how this slash makes the Self possible. I argue that even though the distinction of Self/Other is not about the Other but about the Self; it does not mean that it is an inadequate way for identity analysis.
For a deeper analysis of how the Middle East is constructed, the forms of the Othering should be discussed. Thomas Diez provides four types of Othering, when the other is represented: 1) as a threat; 2) Inferior or exotic (as it was explained by Edward Said); 3) Violating universal principles (universal validity); 4) Different (not inferior, not a threat). However, these types of Othering are ideal. Therefore, they are usually interrelated and mixed.
The first type of the Othering is when the Other is represented through a "specific rhetorical structure" 21 as an existential threat is called 'securitisation'. Securitization is "the discursive process through which an inter-subjective understanding is constructed within a political community to treat something as an existential threat to a valued referent object, and to enable a call for urgent and exceptional measures to deal with the threat." Here it should be noted that even though this article uses a concept of securitization, the theory of securitization is not applied in the article. Weaver and Buzan states that "A successful securitization thus has three components (or steps): existential threats, emergency action, and effects on interunit relations by breaking free of rules." (1998, p. 26 to explain what is "exotic" but, on the other hand, it is much easier to notice when the Other is presented as inferior. This inferiority is related with universal principles because when the Other is not relying on universal principles, it might be claimed that the Other is "not smart enough", "not developed enough" and so on, to understand the values that the Self is claiming as universal.
Therefore, the Orientalising is overlapping with the third type of Othering − claiming universal superiority. This universalist Othering might be explained like this:
"Universalism subjugates the particularity of the other to its own particular code with universalist pretensions; and internal contextualism subjugates the particularity of the other to the myth of universal transparency through intellectual sympathy emanating from superior culture."
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The Other might be constructed as exotic or inferior when values of the Other are not the same as the ones who claims universality. Here, I would like to relate this type of Othering with American exceptionalism because American exceptionalism is "A sense of moral absolutism" 27 and it provides a ground for the Othering. Meghana V. Nayak and Christopher Malone emphasized that "American Orientalism is a style of thought that gets grounding through American is the one that this article is focusing on. This research does not analyse the actions that follow after the speech act. That is especially important to bear in mind in the context that the securitizing actors are mostly decision makers. Think tanks, even though they might have some (undefined) influence on decision makers, are not securitizing actors. Exceptionalism, a particular and specific form of Orientalism intended to produce 'America'."
28 . Even though, all four forms of Othering are used for the production of "America", it might be assumed that American Exceptionalism might be the most obvious reason why "the Middle East" is perceived as "inferior", "exotic", "threatening" and "uncivilized". In addition, it might be assumed that Othering and "The belief in American Exceptionalism provides an essential element of the cultural and intellectual framework for the making and conduct of U.S. foreign policy." 29 Stewart-Harawira inspires some thoughts how the three types of Othering are interrelated in the context of terrorism. She claims that "the use of 'terrorist' as the defining signifier for the 'Other' is legitimated by the supporting discourses of 'freedom' and 'democracy': on that basis others are determined to be 'either for us, or against us'."
30 Therefore, it might be claimed that terrorists are not seen as the same as "us" because they do not live by the same "universal" values; they are inferior to us and, thus, they are an existential threat. Nonetheless, it should be noted that this kind of example of Othering does not justify terrorist activities but it is a good example of explaining the three forms of Othering.
The last type of Othering is the most neutral and that is seen as not harmful when "the other is represented neither as inferior, nor as a threat, but merely as different". 31 It is based on understanding the differences but it does not justify or lead to foreign policy actions that are harmful or discriminatory. It might be argued that this type of Othering is the one that might be perceived as a desirable form of Othering because complete elimination of Othering is not possible.
The method
The main method of this research is semi-structured interviews. This means that the interviews were based on pre-prepared and in-depth questions, however, the interviewer adapted to every interviewee in accordance to his qualifications, experience and responses during the interview. The questions were not sent to the experts before the interviews in order to avoid insincere or just official-institutional The objective was to find out personal views on the Middle East, even though the author cannot claim that this objective was successfully accomplished with all the interviewees. Nevertheless, it might be argued that the interviews were less informal than formal. Nevertheless, one exception should be excluded when the interviewee answered the questions by e-mail. Most of the other interviews were conducted in person (12) as well as few (2) by phone (44 were contacted for the interviews) with experts on the Middle East and US foreign policy towards this region. The shortest interview lasted for 25 minutes and the longest lasted for 1 hour and 20 minutes.
The selected experts come from various think tanks based in Washington, D.C. The main argument for this decision was based on the available literature that is dedicated to the American think tanks. For instance, Andrew Rich argues that think tanks that are based in Washington, D.C. have better chances to be heard and, as a consequence, to influence foreign policy decision makers than others, who are more distant from the capital. He states, that "Washington, D.C. location is helpful for obtaining opportunities to testify and for gaining visibility in news media." 32 The interviews themselves and the occasional conversations with think tankers during the field research in Washington, D.C. also suggests that the physical proximity to the Congress, the Senate and the White House helps think tankers to get easier access to the policy makers.
While selecting think tanks, the attempt was to reflect the variety of U. The important fact to notice here is that 10 of 14 experts have worked for government at some point of their careers and this illustrates the common feature of Washington, D.C, culture, which is called the "revolving door" when former governmental officials join think tanks and vice versa. Finally, it must be stated that the findings of this research are not statistically significant. Because the Arab World is more than the actual physical Middle East, the Maghreb in not the only, and the Levant, is not just the Middle East. North Africa does to some extent belong there. I think, it's more a political, a conglomerate of states and cultures that to some extent have a set of important factors in common, these factors being named in the history, religion to some extent. And there is certain coherence to the system because of overarching regional organizations such as the Arab League because of economic interests that have been generated by centuries of common political structures; they were all part of either Ottoman Empire or the Persian Empire at some point because of reinforcing loyalties that stretch across those boundaries. Meanwhile, another expert claimed that it is a very important question because even though "that is an artificial definition and the way Americans define it, I think, limits sort of how we analyze that region in the world."
"The Middle East" in geographic terms
38 On the other hand, the same expert argued that "culture is important but I think when it comes to [the] U.S. policy and analysis perspective for better or for worse, it's not as dominant as what I think is our security interests that define discourse over [the] U.S. foreign policy as opposed to culture." 39 The artificiality of the definition of the Middle East was mostly reasoned by cultural differences of the Middle East. Another interviewee shared his experiences in the Middle East and explained how it relates with artificiality of the definition: "I was just in Abu Dhabi and Dubai last week and when you're there, you see quite visibly how that definition seems so artificial when countries like India and China are deeply involved in economic ways and have linkages to that region of the world."
40 However, one of the experts highlighted the importance of culture for the definition of the Middle East and used the terms "the Arab World" and "the Middle East" interchangeably. He emphasized that the "Arab World" is "tied by language, by heritage, there's a common history". 41 In general, 47 An interviewee from progressive think tank had similar opinion claiming that "Turkey is in the twilight zone." 48 In general, the opinion that Turkey is not part of the Middle East dominated among experts.
One expert from conservative think tank claimed that he defines Middle East as the Greater Middle East: "I think Islam is [an] important aspect that helps us to define geography of the Greater Middle East."
49 He also includes Turkey as a part of the Middle East even though "it is historically part of Europe". 50 That was an exception because most of the experts rejected this broad definition of the Middle East. For instance, one of them said that government sometimes uses "the word 'Broader Middle East' but that's in the think tank world" 51 ; this theory is not that acceptable. The special cases are the experts of terrorism but "area specialists are very different". 52 An interviewee from other think tank also said that "It becomes a little awkward because some people in the United States put together Afghanistan and even part of South Asia in the Middle East because of our wars, but I think that's not accurate."
53 It might be seen that the definition of the Middle East also depends on the government's definition because when George W. Bush was a president, he used the concept of Broader Middle East, it was more common for experts to use this concept as well.
Another important element of the definition of the Middle East that was discussed was cultural aspects. An expert who himself was from the Middle East had a different opinion than other experts regarding the question whether cultural aspects are important for defining the Middle East:
From my perspective, I see it more as [a] geographical area. Being myself from this region, I am aware of the huge cultural, ethnic, religious and linguistic identities co-existing in the region and therefore, I would not qualify it as simply religious or cultural. It is indeed a geographical area.
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Meanwhile other researchers claimed that cultural elements are important for the definition to an extent. For example, an expert from the non-partisan think tank highlighted: …when people think of the Middle East, they primarily think of Arabs and they primarily think of Islam and certainly that defines or categorizes a lot of countries in the Middle East, have very strong in the proportion of the population that is Muslim. But at the same time that is a lot of diversity, right? I mean, you have lots of different shrines within Islam, obviously. 55 Another expert said that the Middle East is defined by "cultural, Arab cultural connection and tradition and that sort of the person in this region has. 58 In general, the conclusion is that the consensus while defining the Middle East does not exist. On the other hand, most of the scholars agree that the definitions of the Middle East are, for the most part, political or instrumental when it comes to policy analysis. Finally, looking from the theoretical perspective presented above, it might be argued that the Middle East is perceived as inferior, mostly because of the understanding that the Middle East might be defined instrumentally by the United States' researchers and governmental institutions. In the words of Ling, the Middle East as "the Other has no ideas" 59 and that is why it is defined by the superior Self.
Representation of American identity in the context of the Middle East: Universalist superiority
When experts were talking about the U.S. foreign policy towards the Middle East, the answers revealed how the experts perceive identity of the United States. The task during the interviews was not to ask direct questions about the Middle East but to see how experts perceive the Middle East in the context of the U.S. foreign policy. Although this question does not directly answer how think tank experts from the United States perceive "the Middle East", but it evokes images regarding what is the United States in comparison with the Middle East. Thus, it might be claimed that answers to this question indirectly provides some clarity about what is "the Middle East" from the perspective of experts.
One of the important notes that should be drawn here is that some experts referred to "the West" while talking about the U.S. foreign policy towards the Middle East, making some sort of opposition between "the West" and "the Middle East". One of the experts said that he has some doubts about America's abilities 57 Interview K, 2016 58 Interview E, 2016 59 to change situation in the Middle East: "Also, I'm not sure that America alone, the Western World, at large, the international community can actually fix the problems of the region. The region will have to find, to some extent, solutions to these problems on its own and it will be a long and bloody process." 60 This shows that the region is perceived as highly insecure but, nevertheless, the role of the United States or the West should be limited.
However, limited role was not a dominant opinion because most of the researchers see the United States as a "great security provider". 61 Another illustration regarding how experts perceive America's role in the region was expressed by an expert from a non-partisan organization: "we have to look at ourselves in the mirror and say: what kind of role did we play here? Did we play the best role we could have played and all failed despite us? Or maybe we didn't. Maybe we contributed to the failures which I think we did."
62 This indicates the centrality of the Self while talking about the Middle East. The most important element here is not "the Middle East" but what "we" (the United States) have done or have not. As expressed by most researchers, America's role should be more important in the Middle East. It is especially noticeable when talking about the Obama Administration's policies in the Middle East: "There was a failure to take a leadership role, I think, in dealing with the Gulf."
63 Thus, two forms of Othering are visible so far: 1) The other as a threat when the Middle East is constructed as a dangerous region. 2) Inferior or exotic when the Other is seen as having fewer capabilities to live without the "Western" help.
The American Exceptionalism is very strong among experts. For example, when the expert was talking about the Arab Spring and the United States' role in it, there was an emphasis on how the Arab Spring represented those higher values. The superiority of the Self was expressed while calling the Arabs "kids". This expression is written in bold in the following quotation from the interview: I think the Obama administration genuinely believed that the Arab Spring was the opportunity. I think that plenty of Americans, who are after all democrats in their hearts, they don't know anything other than democracy. I think there was genuine support for the Arab Spring, genuine support. We were happy for the Arab kids; we wanted them to have a voice. We wanted them, it was not stupid or naïve. It was a moment of genuine acceleration that change is possible. Why shouldn't it be different than the fall of Berlin Wall? Why shouldn't it be different than the collapse of Soviet Union? It's a moment of human empowerment.
64
This quote illustrates cultural superiority that was claimed by the expert. The interviewee implied that the US has universal or superior values. Therefore, the US "cannot have a conversation with [the] Saudis about Wahhabism". 65 Meanwhile, the Arab Spring is considered as "a big change" 66 when people demonstrated that they wanted democracy as well as the "Western" societies, while the Egyptians were "carrying signs in Tahrir square for democracy". 67 On the opposite side, one of the experts said that democracy is a feature of the "West". The quote below illustrates the expert's scepticism on the democracy in the Middle East and the "Western" culture's superiority:
There are deep cultural undercurrents that work against [democracy, A/N] <...> but certainly one of the key elements that make democracy work is the centrality of individual in the society. We believe that we are all created equal, that we all have intrinsic rights as human beings and the state is meant to guarantee those rights to [an] individual regardless of [his] origin of birth, of religion, of gender and of any personal preference, right? The Middle Eastern societies don't emphasize the individual. They emphasize, they subordinate the individual to a collective. That collective is defined by pretty resilient trades, because they are "blacktized", they are "familytized", they are "clantized", they are "tribeltized".
68
Even though one of the experts claimed that democracy has its basis in the culture, most of the researchers argue that democracy is universal and the Middle East might also be democratic: "I don't believe [that] the Arab World can't have these [institutions, A/N] but I believe in many cases they don't do this over week. So, I do think, I do hope [that] the democratization will come to the region but it's going to be difficult." democracy in [the] most narrowest [sic] terms which is, if you are the majority, you can do anything you want to [do] the minority." 76 Another expert who works for an American think tank, but is from the Middle East claimed that, "Most of the analysts, in and outside the government, assume that the prevailing social paradigms in the region are similar or comparable to those of the West. They usually fail to understand that in a same situation and with the same info, actors in the region will react differently than those in the U.S. or the EU."
77 He also argued that Americans tend to misconceive the Middle East when they assume that people in the Middle East "raise violence not the opposite". 78 However, this person spoke about the necessity for social transformation in the Middle East and that "the problem is not about specific regimes or persons" but that "the majority of people of the region are far from endorsing the values of human dignity, equality and freedom".
79 Thus, the expert was confirming that Middle Eastern societies are just different but then he was also emphasizing the "Western" values that the Middle East should embrace. These contradictory ideas show that the expert is trying to avoid Othering but, at the same time, he reproduces "the Middle East" that is already constructed by common structures of thinking limited by already framed knowledge.
In general, some experts were more cautious about the U.S. chances to transform the Middle East but everyone agreed that it is a must and that something is fundamentally flawed in this region. For instance, one person claimed that the Unites States should accept "with humility that other actors are gonna [sic] try to shape their own destiny and trying to figure out the right way for us to help the countries and the peoples of those countries help themselves is much more effective." 80 These kinds of ideas reflect the widespread image of the "primitive" Middle East in the opposition with the "modern" United States. All these debates are on the context that the United States should be involved in further consolidation of the Middle East without a voice. Consequently, there is no obvious discussion in terms of different U.S. visions for the Middle East and what visions "the Middle East" has for itself. If there are differences of understanding what the Middle East is, they are insignificant because the main language structures that the experts use make the Middle East foreign, distant and dangerous. There is a dominant understanding that "the Middle East" should apply "universal" ideas and, therefore, the Middle East is just a constructed reflection of what "we (the U.S.) are not" without even asking whether this term "the Middle East" is meaningful for the constructed regions' actors at all. Again, it shows that the region is perceived as weak or voiceless.
It seems reasonable to assume that the experts "know" what the Middle East is. In other words, the claims that the Middle East is hard to define in geographical terms does not mean that there is no subscribed meaning for the content of the Middle East. The most common problems that were discussed in the interviews demonstrate that the Middle East is the radical Other and the region is perceived as a problem in its essence. All the problems associated with the Middle East define the region or construct the region as less as geographical place and more as a space of insecurity.
The interviews reveal almost no differences of opinions between the think tanks. They also disclose that the experts belong to the same group, which is recognizable by specific policy language. Despite the finding that construction of the Middle East tells more about the American identity than about the Middle East itself, the fact that the American expertise dominates overall the Middle Eastern studies has implications for the perception on what the Middle East is in general. Besides, the think tank experts have some (even though hardly measurable) influence on policy makers and makes an effort to understand how think tank experts perceive the Middle East even more important.
Securitization of the region
The interviewed think tank experts tend to agree that the general public and politicians perceive the region as a dangerous place because the "desire to withdraw from the Middle East is based upon very common analysis amongst both people on left and on the right that the Middle East is a hopeless region". 81 However, even though they criticize Americans and political elite for being too negative towards the Middle East, their answers to the interview questions expose similar negativity because experts do not suggest solutions and mostly reflect on a current situation in the Middle East and criticism towards Obama's administration.
The Middle East is perceived as one entity partly because of the threats that are seen as coming or originating out of the region. In other words, the region is securitized and that consolidates the idea of "the Middle East". According to the experts, the most important security threat is terrorism. One of the interviewees argued that terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001 brought attention to the political Islam which "is a vital, strong, compelling political alternative to everything 81 Interview K, 2016) else available. It is a riling cry and it is a challenge to Western interests in the region and to the international order, by and large, and to the regional stability." 82 All the researchers related the Middle East with terrorism. One expert has drawn the attention that most of the Middle Eastern scholars are terrorism experts: "people moved from country analysis to functional analysis of terrorist threat. There were think tanks that were created after 9/11 to work on homeland security issues and terrorism."
83 This shows that the Middle East is securitized because the main issue that is analyzed by scholars is terrorism studies. As one of the experts indicated, "The issue of terrorism is now [the] frontal centre of [the] U.S. policy towards the Middle East."
84 Another researcher spoke similarly: "So, we seemed to be in this kind of vicious cycle of counterterrorism-terrorism, terrorism-counterterrorism, which really started on 9/11, of course." 85 The comments of interviewees allow arguing that "the Middle East" is a dangerous place in comparison with the safe "West".
In some regards, experts perceive the Middle East as a place where the United States can materialize their exceptional vision for the world that most of them see as universal. However, researchers have a lot of doubts whether that would be possible, and that way they reinforce the same image of the Middle East, which is primarily seen as insecure. The citation below and the words that are in bold demonstrate the dictionary that is used to describe the Middle East:
I just feel like the refugee issue, ISIS, Iran, a lot of things won't be necessarily entirely resolved but we would certainly [be] in [a] much better place, if there could be some political solution that brought that conflict to an end, because it's horrific. You know, Yemen also is, unfortunately in a very bad shape and never get the attention that it deserves because, I think, it's always a little bit forgotten. Other concerns I have is about a very brutal crackdown in Egypt and how authoritarian, you know, that government has gotten. And I think that they're on a path that's really dangerous and harmful but we don't seem to have ban to manage that as well as everything else. And then, of course, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is always in a backdrop and that seems to be worsening as well of knowing inside. There's no lack of challenges but if we could stop the bloodshed in Syria then I think dealing with some of these other things would be a lot easier.
The expert observed how the general public perceives the Middle East but she emphasized that it is not her personal opinion. The interviewee said that the United States is full of "frustration and negativity" toward the Middle East: "oh, that place is such a mess, no matter what you do nothing works." 87 Another researcher said that it is not only general public that have stereotyped the image of the Middle East: "I don't think we found a way of thinking about the Middle East that works for us and for the Middle Eastern countries and the Middle Eastern people." 88 The lack of security in the Middle East dominated the interviews and was presented as the first issue which has to be "solved" in the region.
The topic of the Middle East's security was mostly focused on the problem of terrorism. While talking about the consequences of 9/11 attacks, one of the interviewees argued that: 
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Middle East." Another researcher spoke similarly: "So, we seemed to be in this kind of vicious cycle of counterterrorism-terrorism, terrorism-counterterrorism, which really started on 9/11, of course."
85 The comments of interviewees allow arguing that "the Middle East" is a dangerous place in comparison with the safe "West". Another researcher had similar opinion and pointed out the necessary measures that should be used in order to counter terrorism:
"We have to tackle a problem of youth unemployment, we have to tackle the problem of education in that country [Iraq] ; we have to tackle the issues of ideology and interpretations or religion and so on. <...> The reason why I'm bringing this up is that the war on terrorism always had what I call nonsecurity components." 90 An expert from non-partisan think tanks was also claiming that "the core root of terrorism is in these governance failures that are really profound, but addressing those challenges takes, I mean, will take a generation."
91 There were also some other topics brought up during the interviews in terms of the Middle Eastern security when think tankers indicated that "tolerating some behaviours, you know, from dictators, as long as there's stability" 92 as one of the major problems which complicates the attempt to "change" the Middle East.
In sum, the Middle East is perceived as a highly insecure and poor region, which should be "educated" or "taught" how to have a more secure life, despite the broad agreement that the U.S. actually failed to accomplish its vision. In other words, the interviews exposed that "the Middle East" is perceived as primitive, dangerous, parochial, and a poor entity in opposition to the modern, safe, prosperous and universal United States of America.
Conclusions
This article reveals that think tankers tend to construct "the Middle East" as one entity and as the Other, even though most of them tend to claim that it is misleading to argue that "the Middle East" is homogenous. The experts pinpoint Interview G, 2015 the differences within the region. However, these differences or heterogeneity are evaluated as the common, uniting feature of it as well as the insecurity. In addition, a lot of experts, consciously or unconsciously, equate the Middle East and Islam as the same entities. The experts were using very similar concepts and ideas when they were talking about the Middle East. Thus, there are no articulated differences of opinions that would reveal different perceptions of the Middle East. Most of the raised ideas are dictated by the political agenda that is already formed in the governmental/congressional debate and that is especially obvious, when a bigger portion of the interviewees admitted that they are using the definition of the Middle East that the Department of State is providing.
If the articulations on the Middle East are examined closely, then the analysis leads to the conclusion that most of the experts speak about "us" rather than "them", even when they are talking about the Middle East. This means the Middle East is the Other, which helps to identify the Self with a reference to the theoretical perspectives on Othering that claim that the creation of the Self is the actual unconscious (or in some cases, conscious) aim of the Othering. Hence, the article argues that the think tank experts contribute to the Othering and to the construction of "the Middle East" by affirming universalistic superiority of the United States. The interviews with the think tank experts on the Middle East showed that despite some experts' attempt to avoid the Othering, they are still involved in the process and mostly because their closeness or, at least aim to be close, to the political process of the decision making. All in all, even though there is no consensus on one definition of the Middle East, this research exposes a plethora of similar perspectives and features that the experts assign to the Middle East. As these features are mostly identified through the question of political agenda or issues that needs to be solved, this leads to the conclusion that question, in this case, of "What is the Middle East?" is directly connected with the question of "What is the United States of America?" The Middle East is seen as the opposite to the United States and primarily as a dangerous and Islamic region. Thus, with reference to Diez's classification of the Othering, it might be claimed that all forms were noticeable during the interviews. Nevertheless, the Other as a threat and the Other as violating universal principles were dominating in comparison to the Other as a different but not inferior entity. The centrality of Self in the construction of the Middle East makes the opposite -the Middle East is perceived primitive, dangerous, poor and parochial Other and, therefore, as an opposition of the modern, safe, prosperous and universal United States of America.
